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THE MICHAEL JACKSON PILL: EQUALITY,
RACE, AND CULTURE
Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr.*
I want a new drug
One that does what it should
One that won't feel too bad
One that won't feel too good
I want a new drug
One with no doubt
One that won't make me talk too much
or make my face break out1

I.

THE CHRONICLE OF THE MICHAEL JACKSON PILL2

I was leaving Langdell Hall, after having feasted too fervently at
my fifteenth law school reunion, when I noticed what looked like a
very ancient document pushed down in the trash can that litters the
small entrance to the main reading room of Langdell. The ancient
scroll seemed out of place so carelessly thrown away outside the
* Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1972, University of Chicago; M.A. 1974, J.D.
1978, Harvard. - Ed. Different versions of this essay were presented to the Critical Race
Theory Summer Workshop at the University of Colorado in 1992 and the University of Wisconsin and Duke University Faculty Workshops in February and March, 1994. I would like to
thank Angela Harris, Lisa Ikemoto, Beverly Moran, Linda Greene, Derrick Bell, John
Calemore, Harlon Dalton, and Lani Guinier for their comments. I would also like to thank
Paulette Caldwell and Patricia Williams for illuminating discussions and my research assistants Frank Cooper and Kevin Vilke for their help. All remaining errors and confusions are
my own.
1. HUEY LEWIS AND THE NEws, I Want a New Drug, on SPORTS {Chrysalis 1983).
2. This chronicle is in tribute to the work of Derrick Bell, past, present, and future. I
have borrowed his character Geneva Crenshaw as part of that tribute, and I hope she helps
me raise some of the issues that he has taught us are important.
All characters in this chronicle are fictional, including Professor Culp and Professor Bell.
Any relationship they may have to the real Professor Bell and Professor Culp is dictated by
the requirements of creativity and the extent to which reality and fiction necessarily merge. I
know that the real Derrick Bell is wiser than the one captured fictionally here, and I believe
that is sometimes true of the real Jerome Culp.
When this essay speaks of Professor Not-Professor-Bell, I do not mean to speak of any
particular person. Initially I had planned to put names at other parts of the chronicle, but I
was persuaded that doing so would be too arrogant. Indeed, unlike an earlier work of mine,
see Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward A Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original
Understandings, 1991 DuKE LJ. 39, 99-105, this essay does not have any particular
individuals in mind when I speak of generic professors or characters.
I hope that I am not dismissive of the important ideas among scholars of color who are
noted here. For a discussion of some of the pitfalls of this area, see Patricia Williams, And
We Are Not Married: A Journal of Musings upon Legal Language and the Ideology of Style,
in CONSEQUENCES OF THEORY 181, 183-87 (Jonathan Arac & Barbara Johnson eds., 1991).
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world's largest law school library. I picked it up and was surprised
to discover that there, very near Derrick Bell's former office, I had
found another of the scrolls that Professor Bell's friend Geneva had
revealed to him before she joined the celestial curia. 3 What was this
wondrous document doing in Langdell Hall? Maybe it was some
further message from Geneva Crenshaw that had been dropped there
for me to discover. I rushed to find Professor Bell to tell him of my
good luck.
As I approached the office that had once belonged to Professor
Bell, I noticed a group of six black men standing together in the hallway. Much to my surprise and delight, I recognized among them the
five faculty members at Harvard Law School who are both black and
male. I know of Scott Brewer and his work as careful thinker and
philosopher. 4 David Wilkins is a friend and had even once been an
excellent student in one of the undergraduate economics classes I
taught as a graduate student at Harvard. 5 Charles Ogletree 6 and

3. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QuEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 51-74 (1987) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED]; DERRICK BELL, FACES
AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) (hereinafter BELL,
FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL].
4. Professor Brewer has added the hard edge of philosophical insight to debates about
legal theory and critical thought. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Introduction: Choosing Sides in the
Racial Critiques Debate, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1844 (1990) (examining the debate precipitated
by Randall Kennedy's article on "racial critiques" and suggesting that there is a kind of com·
mon ground that the nature of the debate has obscured); Scott Brewer, Pragmatism, Oppres·
sion, and the Flight to Substance, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1753 (1990) (arguing that there is a
tension in the notion of deferring to the perspective of the oppressed and that in the end we
have to make our own moral judgments - that is, the flight to substance). But see Richard
Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on Common Cause, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1991)
(arguing that Brewer requires too large a compromise and sees more commonality than actu·
ally exists).
5. Professor Wilkins is Professor of Law and Director of the Program on the Legal Pro·
fession at Harvard. His writing focuses on the nature and ethics of the legal profession. See,
e.g., David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye Scholer, 66
S. CAL. L. REV. 1147 (1993) (asking how the context of the relationship of Kaye, Scholer to
Lincoln Savings affected the way both the OTS and Kaye, Scholer's expert looked at the
problem and how that type of context ought to influence the ethical responsibilities of law·
yers); David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in
Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1981 (1993) (examining
the proper role of legal education in forming the ethics of the black corporate lawyer); David
B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1992) (providing a
careful examination of how and when lawyers should be regulated for their unethical
conduct).
6. Professor Ogletree, a great teacher and lawyer, has written powerfully about the crimi·
nal justice system. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motiva·
tions to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1239 (1993) (arguing for a larger
rationale for lawyers to represent the indigent and to sustain that representation through
empathy and heroism).

August 1994]

Equality, Race, and Culture

2615

Chris Edley7 had been contemporaries of mine at Harvard Law
School, and I had read with increasing interest the powerful epistles
from Randall Kennedy about race and the law, which are now sprinkled in the important law reviews and symposia. 8 The sixth man was
not Professor Bell, nor did I know him from Harvard, but he nonetheless looked familiar and unmistakably professorial. 9 Seeing this
group gathered there confirmed the only possible interpretation of
my discovery - I had been given the opportunity to share it with
those at Harvard who would most appreciate its significance and,
perhaps, explain it to me. It could not simply be by chance that I had
discovered this document now.
"Hey guys! What are you doing here?" I asked, chuckling
secretly to myself about my discovery. However - as I was about to
say some new version of "Guess what I found?" - I noticed that
they all held scrolls that looked markedly like mine. Without an additional word we all opened our scrolls to find identical statements:
Dr. Michael Jackson, a doctor educated at Motown University and
now a professor of medical appearance at Hollywood University, has
invented a pill that if taken by black people will remove all vestiges of
being black; Black features will disappear from black people who
take the pill, and they will be given a random selection of names that
white people in America have. Black speech patterns and ways of
organizing expression will go away. With respect to every outside appearance, all black people who take the pill will become white.
The legislature of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has passed
Massachusetts General Law 1619.28, requiring all black residents of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to take the Michael Jackson
Pill. Black residents who do not take the pill are subject to fines of up
to $2,000. Sonny Flynn, speaker of the Massachusetts Assembly, said,
"This bill will for all time remove the vestiges of slavery that have
plagued this great commonwealth." The NAACP objects to the application of this statute to black residents of Massachusetts and asks the
five black Harvard faculty members and Professor Derrick Bell to
write a brief and argue the case. Representative· King, one of three
African Americans in the Massachusetts House of Representatives,
7. Professor Edley has written powerfully about the administrative process. See, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY (1990).
8. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the
Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE LJ. 999 (1989); Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp:
Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1388 (1988); Randall
Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 1327 (1986); Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration:
The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 1622 (1986).
9. Professor Not-Professor-Bell, the sixth in the group of black male faculty members, is
a fictional character. His views are an amalgam of many views from within the black academic community.
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has pointed out that evidence suggests that white people who take the
pill will become black. He argues that black is beautiful and that we
ought to make all white people take the pill. Marjorie Jones, a white
professor of political economy at the Kennedy School, in a widely
cited argument, has noted that it is cheaper to have black people take
the pill and that the problems with race are basically confined to the
unfortunate segment that is black. "We, the white citizens of Massachusetts, are willing to welcome black people to that great white melting pot," she adds.

We were all instantly removed to a conference room nearby, with
Derrick Bell at one end of the table and at the other an empty chair.
Several of the faculty began to talk simultaneously when a deep but
very feminine voice, belonging unmistakably to Geneva Crenshaw,
interrupted ...
Geneva Crenshaw: Excuse me - ~xcuse me. I see that you are
all here. I have called all of you here today to discuss with Derrick
how this latest chronicle ought to come out. The question is
whether black people should take this pill. Can we be saved by a
pill that transforms all black people into white people? Derrick has
been making trouble by questioning whether some of you even
want to be white, but Dr. Jackson has given all black people that
opportunity.
Professor Bell: Gee - I think I need to know a little bit more
about this pill.
Geneva Crenshaw: You mean you want to know whether you
still will have rhythm after you take the pill.
Professor Culp: We all know your penchant for hyperbole, Ms.
Crenshaw, but hasn't this description of the pill been too simplistic?
Eliminating blackness may exact a heavy price, and personally, I
like being black.
Geneva Crenshaw: I don't know who you are - though there
must be a reason for you to be here - but the point is so simple
that a third-year law student could see it without the benefit of Emmanuel's. You take the pill and you aren't black anymore though some of you may have to take it twice. The pill doesn't
eliminate class or other characteristics, but I understand that Dr.
Phyllis Schafly is working on a pill that will remove gender.
Professor Bell: I think we ought to start with a vote to see how
many people think that all black people ought to be required to
take this pill.
[The black male faculty look around at each other. Some raise
their hands - most of them slowly. Others look disturbed but do
not raise their hands.
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Professor Culp keeps raising and lowering his hand.
One by one they each start to spe,ak, asking questions of Geneva
Crenshaw and of one another and beginning a debate that continues
for some time. (Unfortunately, not all of this conversation can be
chronicled here.) After listening to his compatriots carry on for a
while, the strange-yet-familiar professor joins the conversation .. .]
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: I don't understand your ambivalence, Professor Culp. This pill washes away all the manifestations
of racial difference. You have pointed out in your writing the importance of race as a cause of our nation's problems. Race will be
no more, and therefore racial problems will be no more.
Professor Culp: I'm sorry, but the issue is still not clear to me. I
gain from being black. My parents have strength of character that
aids me in my work. The history of my family has an importance
that would be erased if there were no culture or language or notion
of place that was connected with being black.
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: Race is simply a cultural creation.
As Professor Kendall Thomas of Columbia Law School is fond of
saying, black people are raced.10 The pill removes the power of
white people to race us.
Professor Culp: I understand that we are raced by society, but
culture means something positive to me. People are raced, but people are also cultured and the two are interdependent. There are,
therefore, positive and negative sides to the issue of race. Black
people invent themselves as black people through culture and
history.
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: We're all lawyers here, not cultural critics. Race will not matter in the job market when black
people have taken the pill and become white. Being black doesn't
make one a better janitor or a better law professor. Culture is a
social creation: with this pill, those of us who want to love jazz or
basketball or Toni Morrison or Gwendolyn Brooks can do so without the handicap of difference. Race doesn't matter, so taking it
away shouldn't matter either. Indeed - what we want to eliminate
are the transient and unimportant things that get in the way of
equality.
10. See Charles Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Cam-

pus, 1990 DUKE LJ. 431. "Moreover, the cultural meaning of race continues to be promulgated through millions of ongoing contemporaneous speech/acts. Thus, [Kendall Thomas]
says, 'we are raced.' The social construction of race is an ongoing process." Id. at 443 n.52
(citing Kendall Thomas, Comments at a Panel on Critical Race Theory, Frontiers of Legal
Thought Conference, Duke Law School (Jan. 26, 1990)).
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Professor Culp: I'm not sure that race is so easily disconnected
from our notjon of what a law professor is. I was pushing a garbage
cart toward my office one evening when the child of two of my
black colleagues, Gwynn Swinson and Percy Luney, asked me
whether I had to do a second job. My colleagues' child understood
that at least at Duke, what you do is closely .connected with your
race. Black people clean and wash toilets, and if they are special,
like her parents, they may get to teach at a law school. Her fear consistent with her experience - was that all black people secretly
had to be cleaning people, doing some black job as well as a white
job.
Geneva Crenshaw: You may be right, Professor Culp, but not
completely. You see race from the patriarchal perspective of being
a black male. This very male room may be willing to take the pill
without understanding the implications of culture. However, gender and other notions of identity cannot be separated from race,
and culture holds gender and race together. Black men always
think that if their apparent problem were solved - if only they
weren't black - then the problems of black people would go away.
The point is that black problems are more than simply race as defined by what black men are concerned about. Maybe fewer people
would have their hands up if there were more black women or
other women of color in the room - people who understand that
oppression is a multiple-aspect condition.
Professor Culp: But Geneva, black men are oppressed. They
are jailed and die at an alarming rate.
Geneva Crenshaw: You don't have to tell black women about
black men. The problem is that black men want to define the problem of black people only from their own perspective. Black women
are oppressed by both race and gender, and this pill does nothing
about this multiple oppression.
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: Isn't that the point, Ms.
Crenshaw? This pill will eliminate any intersection between race
and gender.
Professor Culp: ·The intersection will only be eliminated if we
also remove the economic and other concerns produced by the interaction of race and gender.
Geneva Crenshaw: Close, but only a B- for theoretical rigor.
The intersection of race and gender or of race, class, and gender
cannot be reduced either to separate concerns or to a combination
of concerns that are measured in economic values. The intersection
of race and gender leaves black women always still women with the
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additional oppression of blackness. This oppression, however, is
not simply added on. Oppressions, like rabbits, multiply exponentially when they are combined.
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: But taking the race pill will eliminate that multiplication by eliminating race, Geneva.'
Professor Culp: That will only be true if we know what race is
and what happens when we eliminate that social construction. It
may take a race-gender pill to eliminate the intersections if race and
gender add together to form something more powerful ...
Geneva Crenshaw: I see why some people think you law professors are too theoretical. Before you get to a race, gender, class, or
sexual orientation oppression pill, deal with the problem we have
before us. You have not answered the question of whether you
think the law ought to require black people to take the Michael
Jackson Pill. It might be true that we should not desire that black
people give up jazz and storytelling, but there are white people who
play jazz and who tell stories. Haven't you, Professor Culp, fallen
into the trap of essentialism? You assume that race exists when it is
in fact a political illusion.
Professor Culp: I am not naive. I read the biological and historical literature. I know that people have argued that there is no
meaningful biological basis for race,11 but that does not mean that
we cannot worry about its social consequences.
Professor Bell: I argued in my most recent book that racism is a
permanent phenomenon.12 The problem I see is that this pill cures
race but not racism.
Geneva Crenshaw: You men just don't get it. The point of this
exercise is to ask what the role of the government ought to be with
respect to race and racism; after all, one can't exist without the
other. Should we make people take the pill?
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: I read most of the employment
discrimination cases, and there are lots of pills that - in effect the law tries to impose on black people, but none of these "pills"
are quite th~ Michael Jackson Pill. In passing the 1991 Civil Rights
Act,13 Congress proposed not that black people take a pill that
11. See, e.g., Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of
Race, in "RAcE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 21, 21-22 (Henry L. Gates, Jr., ed., 1985); D.
Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 GEo. LJ. 437
(1993).
12. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL, supra note 3, at 13.
13. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
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eliminates blackness but that they take one that replaces blackness
with merit. Title VII, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, now
excludes the use of race as an indicator of anything. We have created, at least in the employment area, the requirement of colorblind decisions.
Professor Bell: I'm sorry, but I too have followed those statutory changes and the legal interpretations and I don't see that. Professor Culp has argued that there is a distinction between
antidiscrimination and color blindness, and I am persuaded that on
this point he is right. Title VII is a color-conscious statute. The
improper use of race and the other categories alone triggers the
protective mechanisms of Title VII and other civil rights statutes.
Race, not merit, is used to limit employers' decisions. Merit is not
mentioned, and, even though merit is a defense in some Title VII
actions, the courts have often said that Title VII does not require
that the most meritorious person be hired. 14
Professor Culp: At best Title VII says that you can't be caught
using race as a factor, but it doesn't even suggest color blindness.
Geneva Crenshaw: But don't you admit that being color conscious to try to eliminate the negative consequences of race can reduce the negative impact of race? Isn't that, by your logic, a kind of
antirace pill that we should require people to take?
Professor Culp: That might be so if employers couldn't peek at
race and use it covertly to achieve the ends they want. 15
Geneva Crenshaw: So if we could cure employers of their racial
voyeurism, you would be happy?
14. See, for example, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in McCarthney v. Griffin-Spalding
County Board of Education, 791F.2d1549 {11th Cir. 1986):
Title VII does not require an employer to hire or promote the most qualified applicant;
it only requires that the employer make such decisions without regard to race, sex, reli·
gion, color, or national origin. Although failure to hire the most qualified applicant may
be circumstantial evidence of discrimination .••.
. . . This unpublicized use of recommendations, standing by itself or considered with
the alleged failure to hire the most qualified person, does not make the district court's
credibility determination clearly erroneous.
·
791 F.2d at 1552 (citations omitted); see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 463 (1982)
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("Title VII does not require that employers adopt merit hiring or the
procedures most likely to permit the greatest number of minority members to be considered
for or to qualify for jobs and promotions."); Smith v. Horner, 839 F.2d 1530, 1539 (11th Cir.
1988) ("Where, as here, several candidates are well-qualified for a single position, and the
district court accepts the employer's testimony that it chose the person it thought best quali·
fled for the job, that finding ordinarily will not be overturned on appeal.").

15. See generally Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectional·
ity of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162
{1994).
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Professor Culp: No. I really think the problem is that the pill
that Title VII and the 1991 Civil Rights Act offer requires that
black people accept market outcomes. It's really a kind of Thomas
Sowell Pill that promises equality in some distant, market-induced
future. 16
Geneva Crenshaw: You've lost me and, I'm sure, much of this
room with your argument. If I remember my history correctly, it
was Booker T. Washington who argued for market solutions well
before Thomas Sowell, Glenn Loury, and Walter Williams were
born.17
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: Isn't the truth that the market solution can get widespread community support, while other policies
and pills simply can't?
Professor Culp: I guess I remember that history differently also.
Booker T. Washington argued for market solutions, but he never
was convinced they would be sufficient. He was being expedient. I
would hate to be expedient here and urge black people to take a
pill that won't solve their problems.
Geneva Crenshaw: There are no guarantees about any solution,
but isn't that all we ever have - expediency? If expediency says
take the pill, shouldn't we swallow and complain later? Title VII,
even as this Court has interpreted it, is not perfect, but isn't it
expedient?
Professor Culp: The Supreme Court for a long time has been
making it more difficult for black employees to succeed with respect to employment discrimination. In a series of decisions starting with Watson 18 and culminating in Patterson19 and Wards Cove, 20
the Court has suggested that the claims that black people were
making were not remediable.21 Despite recent congressional chas16. Thomas Sowell is a conservative black economist who has argued that blacks ought to
rely on market solutions and that government solutions cannot work. See, e.g., THOMAS
SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORffiES 103-24 {1981).
17. See Booker T. Washington, The Economic Development of the Negro Race Since in
Slavery, in THE NEGRO IN THE SOUTH 9 {1907) (arguing that black people have experienced
great progress through hard work, reliance on the market, and religious faith).
18. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
19. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
20. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
21. See 487 U.S. at 992-99 (expanding the scope of disparate impact claims to cover subjective or discretionary promotion programs, but also asserting that employers have no duty
to eliminate all the varied causes of racial imbalance in the workplace); 491 U.S. at 175-82
(holding a claim of racial harassment not to be actionable under§ 1981); 490 U.S. at 650-55
(stating that racial imbalance alone cannot be a ground for invoking Title VII because it
would necessitate strict racial quotas, which were rejected by Title VII's drafters).
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tisement of part of that trend,22 in Hicks23 the Court has again
made the point that Title VII should not be too effective or reach
too much of the real discrimination. As you will remember, this
was a case in which a black male employee was discharged from a
supervisory job.24 The employer articulated two rationales for this
discharge, both of which the district court rejected as unsupported
by the record. Instead, the district court, sitting as trier of fact, concluded that the white supervisor might have simply had personal
animus.25 The court came to this conclusion despite the fact that
the supervisor testified that he had no personal animus against
Hicks.26 Can we really expect the market to rectify this sort of judicial reasoning over the long haul?
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: I don't understand this criticism.
Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act, expanding the opportunities of women, including black women, and repealing Patterson
and Wards Cove. 27 It is true that the Court has been reluctant to
require racial quotas - that, after all, is what Justice O'Connor
criticized in Watson, 2 s and the Court ratified O'Connor's position in
Wards Cove. 29 However, the Court expanded its definition of sexual harassment in the Harris case30 so that an employee who wants
22. The 1991 Civil Rights Act explicitly rejects Wards Cove:
SEC 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that (2) the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protec·
tions; and
(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful discrim·
ination in employment.
SEC 3. PURPOSES.
The purposes of this Act are -

(2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job related" enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other
Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio ....
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); see also Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutral·
ity, The Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act: The "Impossibility" of Permanent Re·
form, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 965 (1993). See generally Reginald C. Govan, Honorable
Compromises and the Moral High Ground: The Conflict Between the Rhetoric and the Con·
tent of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 50-59 (1993) (describing how
opponents of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence sought to overturn five Supreme Court decisions handed down at the end of the 1989 Term).
23. St. Maiy's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
24. 113 s. a. at 2746.
25. 113 S. Ct. at 2748.
26. 113 S. Ct. at 2766 (Souter, J., dissenting).
27. See supra note 22.
28. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991-93 (1988).
29. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 652 (1989).
30. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct: 367 (1993).
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to prove sexual harassment does not have to prove psychological
damage to win a lawsuit.31 Indeed, even Justice O'Connor, writing
· for the majority in Watson, approved the use of disparate impact
analysis in situations involving subjective criteria.32
Professor Bell: But at the same time Justice O'Connor held for
a plurality in Watson what became the majority opinion in Wards
Cove: that the burden of proof in disparate impact analysis should
always be on the plaintiff.33 Congress modified that holding, at
least in part, in the 1991 Civil Rights Act, but it did not do so dearly
and effectively enough.
Professor Culp: And it is clear that the decisions in those sexual
harassment cases, while useful, will not be expanded to remove racial slurs and a discriminatory atmosphere from the workplace for
black people. Courts are going to continue to argue that the racial
slurs were not "extensive" or "personal" enough to create an actionable harm.
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: You seem to want to exaggerate
Professor Culp: Isn't it obvious that the most likely beneficiary
of such a situation is a white male who is subject to an inappropriate atmosphere in the workplace? I've noticed some reports on the
enforcement of these racially enhanced criminal statutes in the aftermath of the Mitchell case.34 In North Carolina a disproportionate share of the prosecutions for racial motivation have been of
black people.35 It is hard to believe, even in 1994, that there is so
little white racial violence in North Carolina. Why should we expect anything else in the employment discrimination area?
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: Aren't you making the same mistake you accused us of earlier? Some of the women who are sexually harassed are black women, and the Court, by trying to give
them protection, is likely to provide some more protection for ex31. 114 S. Ct. at 370-71.
32. See 487 U.S. at 989-91.
33. See 487 U.S. at 994 (plurality opinion); 490 U.S. at 656.
34. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (upholding a Wisconsin statute providing
for enhanced sentences for hate crimes); see, e.g., Pedro Ponce, Some Question Use of HateCrime Laws by Victimized Whites, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 5, 1994, at A36.
35. Todd Nelson, Racial violence poses dilemma, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Apr. 11,
1994, at lA, 4A (reporting that some observers contend that blacks are more likely to ·be
charged under North Carolina's penalty enhancement statute). According to Christina
Davis-McCoy, executive director of North Carolinians Against Racist and Religious Violence, the North Carolina bias crime legislation was intended "to protect groups that had
historically experienced animosity, victimization and violence .... But they tend to use the
law to protect the majority." Id. at 4A.
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actly that intersection between race and gender that you claim
you're worried about.
Professor Culp: Yes, but the Court seems to flinch even in that
area. When Ms. Patterson was harassed, the Court was unwilling to
say that the harassment amounted to discrimination cogQ.izable
under the law. The Court said instead that harassment after formation of the employment contract was outside the confines of 42
U.S.C. § 1981, whic:h refers to the "making" of contracts.36
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: Aren't you exaggerating here?
Patterson does not limit the ability of black women to get protection
under Harris or Vinson, 37 the cases in which the Supreme Court
defined sexual harassment discrimination.
Professor Culp: The point is that Title VII assumes that equality
will result if we simply leave the present processes in place, or, put
differently, that we will achieve racial equality without active government intervention.
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: You're arguing that the antidiscrimination pill will not alter the present because you dislike the
status quo. But law can't alter the status quo. If black people are
to achieve racial equality, they will have to work on it themselves.
Law has a limited role to play, and the pills you describe, whether
they are Michael Jackson Pills or Thomas Sowell Pills, will play that
limited role. The rest is up to us, in our own communities.
Professor Culp: You sound like Justice Bradley in the Civil
Rights Cases, 38 arguing that law can only do so much,3 9 just as the
protection of law is being taken away from black citizens.
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: That's the point made by Gerry
Spann in his book Race Against the Court 40 - that we cannot expect the courts to protect our interests in the long run.
Professor Culp: But isn't Professor Spann's point even less optimistic than you suggest? He writes not only that the courts won't
be a force for change but also that they will sometimes be an active
force for oppression.41 Moreover, these pills leave no room for involvement by communities. Race is eliminated as a positive creator
of communities, as are the opportunities for those racially created
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1989).
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
See 109 U.S. at 11-25.
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME
MINORffiES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1993).
41. See id. at 3-5, 94-99.
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communities to produce change. When people try to create change
in the job market, they are likely to be the targets of lawsuits; when
they are successful in getting the legislature or Congress to make a
change, the courts will limit and frustrate that effort. Hasn't Derrick shown that in his book Faces at the Bottom of the Well? 42
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: On the other hand, the elimination of race also eliminates white communities opposed to change.
After all, the Ku Klux Klan is a racially created community for
keeping the racial status quo.
Professor Culp: Indeed, the Democratic party was at times a
racially created community to prevent change in the black community, particularly in the South.43 However, this pill doesn't eliminate the white community; it simply permits those who take the
Michael Jackson Pill to enter it. If the white community contains
elements of oppression, it may reinvent other subcommunities of
people to oppress - people who tan too well or who have other
characteristics. And for those black people who choose to stay
black, race will still exist, as will racism.
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: The courts limit the notions of
equality that the legislature or Congress can use, but they do not
eliminate the ability of those institutions to make changes. What
this pill does is provide choice to black people in the same way that
Roe v. Wade 44 provides choice to women about pregnancy.
Professor Culp: One of my white male students wondered
whether he could challenge a minority clerkship that was created
for black first-year law students in a large southern law firm without
many black associates and partners. He questioned whether such a
program was fair or legal. My answer was that the program is probably legal, but as the market becomes tighter, it is going to be more
and more difficult to prevent courts from overturning any victory
accomplished in Congress or state legislatures or local governments
or by community groups. The Court's jurisprudence in Croson, 45

42. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTIOM OF THE WELL, supra note 3, at 49-51.
43. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (holding that a Texas statute excluding
"negroes" from the Democratic primary violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (holding that a state effort to circumvent Nixon v. Herndon by
permitting the Democratic party to become a private club also violated the Fourteenth
Amendment).
44. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
45. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down a Richmond
set-aside program for minorities).
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Hicks, 46 and Shaw v. Reno41 supports this view. When black people
engage fairly in the governing process, their views are found to be
inappropriate if they alter the racial status quo. Such alteration
threatens white supremacy, which the Supreme Court is not willing
to eradicate.
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: Aren't you making this student
out to be a villain when he is simply trying for fairness? Why
should the son of a black doctor get a job instead of the son or
daughter of a white mechanic?
Professor Culp: You miss the point, just as that student and, too
often, the Court do. Racial communities have played the same role
regarding problems of class that the gay community has in the
AIDS health crisis. We know that there is a class and poverty problem in this country primarily because we can see evidence of the
problem in the black community. The gay community's involvement with AIDS allowed all of us to understand the existence of the
AIDS health crisis much earlier than we would have otherwise.
Communities and the differences those communities produce have
importance and power that individuals do not - for good as well as
evil. A large part of the power behind change for the poor comes,
not from the larger white poor community, but from the black poor
who are fairly egalitarian about the change they support.
Geneva Crenshaw: This sounds like the argument often heard in
black literary and political circles - that blacks have some mythic
ability to suffer and to redeem white America.48
Professor Culp: No, I don't believe pain is good for the soul or
necessarily leads to redemption. I see too much pain in our poor
communities of color and too little redemption there. I'm trying to
make a different point. The redemption thesis assumes that we can
only see the world through the lenses of the majority. I would like
to see it through the lenses of the black minority and the other communities of color. In those communities we can form action, not as
an example of pain or as victims of oppression, but as positive
forces for change.
Geneva Crenshaw: Does this mean that you think that the black
community alone will solve the problems of poverty and race?
46. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (making disparate treatment
discrimination under Title VII harder to prove).
47. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (holding that a race-conscious redistricting plan that is so irregular on its face that it can only be explained as an effort to separate voters into different
districts on the basis of race may violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
48. See WILSON J. MOSES, BLACK MESSIAHS AND UNCLE TOMS: SOCIAL AND LITERARY
MANIPULATIONS OF A RELIGIOUS MYTH 1-48 (rev. ed. 1993).
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Professor Culp: My point is that one of the· few forces for
change in our society comes from the politics surrounding race. If
we eliminate that positive force it will be even more difficult to accomplish change in the world. One of the reasons I suspect that
Title VII and the other antidiscrimination statutes have become less
effective is precisely because the enforcement efforts have lost any
connection to a sense of community. The Court's efforts to limit
class actions49 and its desire to make Title VII solely a tool of individualism50 have been part of that separation of community and
enforcement.
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: I agree with you that community
is important, but why does it have to be black community? Isn't it
possible that the reason other communities are not forces for
change is that race gets in the way? If that's true, removing the
notion of race not only will eliminate that impediment but also may
allow new, more effective, nonracial communities to come into
existence.
Professor Culp: What you say is theoretically possible, but the
truth is that the most effective communities have been those that
have some notion of identity that empowers change. This has been
true for ethnic groups - Jews and Italians, for example - as well
as for some Asian groups and some religious groups - including
Mormons and Catholics. All these groups have used a sense of
community - defined in different ways - to accomplish social and
economic progress.
Professor Bell: You're saying that the very idea behind the pill
runs counter to the forces that have produced change in America
49. See, e.g., East Texas Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977) (rejecting
the lower court's view that plaintiffs did not necessarily have to suffer an injury to serve as
class representatives).
50. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1983) (stating - in both the majority and
the dissenting opinion - that Title VII's primary aim is to protect individuals).
The Court has not completely rejected group claims, even in Teal. However, the Justices
who replaced Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun leave the Court in a position not
conducive to success for group claims. The bias against group claims is evident in St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). In Hicks, the Court refused to grant relief to a
black male petitioner because the trier of fact concluded that he had failed to prove that his
discharge was motivated by race, even though he had shown that the reasons proffered by the
employer were pretextual. 113 S. Ct. at 2748-49. The district court assumed that the discharge must have been motivated by personal animosity - a theory that the petitioner was
never given the opportunity to refute - and failed to consider the possibility that this animosity was itself racially motivated. 113 S. Ct. at 2766 (Souter, J., dissenting). By allowing
this reasoning to stand - and remanding only for a review of the district court's factual
determination, see 113 S. Ct. at 2756 - the Court expressed its understanding of the petitioner's claim as essentially an individual claim. The petitioner claimed to be treated badly
because he was black; the Court evaluated his claim as a claim by an individual first and as a
black man second. This understanding belies the group genesis of Title VII.
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and that we will not be able to accomplish change without some
notion of community.
Professor Culp: People are not identity-less automatons. If we
eliminate people's race and the communities in which they exist,
can they be whole?
Geneva Crenshaw: As I understand it, the Michael Jackson Pill
creates a person who is not raceless but white. Aren't you simply
doing what you criticize in others, Professor Culp, by assuming that
white people don't have a race?
Professor Culp: You may be right. What I meant to say is that
we cannot make black people into white people without losing
something important.
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: How can that be? Race has no
meaning. Professor Culp, you're looking for a form of essentialism
that replaces race with culture. As Anthony Appiah has said, this
does not solve the problem of essentialism.s1 More importantly,
aren't you falling into the trap set by the Afrocentric essentialists,
who argue for a superior black culture? They would replace white
supremacy with black supremacy. Aren't you arguing for a milder
version of that pill? If race doesn't matter, then the community we
replace the black community with will be better than the one that
exists.
Professor Culp: Isn't that just assuming that race doesn't matter
or that white is superior to black? Why not require white people to
take a pill to change their race? After all, most of the world is
made up of people of color.
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: If race doesn't matter, then
whether we have black people take the Michael Jackson Pill - the
cheaper solution- or whether white people take the Michael Jackson Pill, the results will be the same.
Professor Bell: Even if you believe that and you do not harbor
any antiblack feelings, isn't it clear that Massachusetts is acting because it does harbor those fears and antagonisms? That fact requires us to use different weights in our own analysis of this
problem and in interpreting what might be the Court's analysis.
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: Would you two make the same
argument if we were talking about a pill to make people thin? The
First Circuit has, correctly, found obesity to be a disability under
51. See

KwAME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN

PHY OF CULTURE

28·46, 173-80 (1992).

Mv FATHER'S HousE:

AFRICA IN THE PHILOSO·
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the Americans With Disabilities Act.52 Are we going to have communities of the disabled blocking us from giving fat people pills to
eliminate obesity because some people think there is a fat community or a community of disabled people? It seems to me that we
have to be able to allow law to make people normal. Law reflects
norms and the status quo. We cannot escape these norms, and it is
fruitless to try. The fat have no more right to be fat than those who
won't work have to get paid.
Professor Culp: I take it your point is that race and fatness can
be defined by society as bad and that we should accept those
community-imposed norms.
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: Yes, law has to reflect the decisions of society. Those decisions may change over time as society
changes, but no society can exist that cannot impose its own norms
on those it identifies as "deviants."
Professor Culp: My problem is that you are defining race as
deviance and the black community as wrong. We all suffer when we
allow law to be just an enforcement of community norms. Law also
has to be able to live with difference.
Geneva Crenshaw: Professor Culp, you've criticized the solutions others have suggested for reaching racial equality. The colorblindness pill won't work, you say, because we can peek at color.
The assimilation pill won't work because it is too damaging to the
black psyche and because white society really is not able to fully
assimilate black people. And the antidiscrimination pill won't work
because the enforcers of the process are also racist. What pill
would you suggest? It's easy to criticize but harder to help us construct a better future.
Professor Culp: I think the ultimate problem is the view that
this kind of micropill will ever work to attack race or racism. Indeed, the problem I see at the heart of our legal system is a reliance
on microchoices that leave unresolved macroproblems. I guess I
think we've described the problem in the wrong way. The real
problem with these pills as a solution is not what is changed but
what isn't. Black employees are given the choice to change their
hair, their mannerisms, and their neighborhoods in order to fit in,
but even those choices are not likely to be enough to ensure a
change in the status quo. As long as race is connected to crime,
poverty, and unemployment, no black person can escape the impact
52. See Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17 {1993); see also Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990)).
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of racism no matter what microchoices she makes, including in the
job market.
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: Don't you exaggerate the problem here? It won't happen overnight, but we do see progress. Indeed, your life and ours around this table prove that Title VII and
what you call the market pill and the Michael Jackson Pill are
working.
Geneva Crenshaw: Does it really prove that there has been progress? Or does it just show that, having taken your own tenurepassing pills, you all are not able to see the negative aspects of your
conditions?
Professor Culp: Maybe our own pills have worked imperfectly,
Ms. Crenshaw, but that does not give you the right to make fun of
us. All of us have pointed to different kinds of evidence that these
pills will not continue to work successfully. Black progress has
stalled through much of the last fifteen years, and there seems to be
little indication that it's likely to speed up again. I agree that some
of us, including me, may sometimes engage in a form of celebration
of the status quo that ought to be decried. Some seem to believe
that if we wait, the long-run processes will lead to justice. That
need not be true, and there is strong evidence that it is not true
now.
Professor Not-Professor-Bell: You are simply making Derrick's
point in a different way. You seem to believe that the fact of racism
is so powerful that microchoices in law will lead to bad results. I've
read your criticism of Judge Posner's opinion in Consolidated Service Systems. 53 In that case he argued that the market will sometimes produce choices that seem discriminatory but that also make
sense. Judge Posner argued that a Korean employer who decided
to hire only from the Korean community, for what Judge Posner
concluded were nondiscriminatory reasons, did not violate Title
VII.54 The market, Judge Posner argued, is more powerful than our
macrodesires for racial equality. The market matters, Posner tells
us, and our desire to have it not matter will not alter the experience
or choices of employers or employees. Saying the market matters
does not mean I celebrate the fact, but I am realistic about how
change can occur in our society.
53. EEOC v. Consolidated Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993); see Jerome McCristal
Culp, Jr., Small Numbers, Big Problems, Black Men, and the Supreme Court: A Reform Pro·
gram for Title VII After Hicks, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. (forthcoming Spring 1994) (manuscript at
13-14, on file with author).
54. 989 F.2d at 236.
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Professor Culp: The market matters, but if we accept the market and we only try to deal with microchoices, we are unlikely to
achieve racial equality. The problem is in thin~ing that any particular microchoice - any pill - will work without extensive efforts by
the government to alter the macroopportunities of communities.
Black middle-class and black poor people have been making the
right microchoices about what neighborhood to live in and where to
send their kids. The right choices benefit their children and themselves in the short run, but those choices will not build a nonracist
community or fight the oppression that exists for those who have
fewer choices.
Geneva Crenshaw: So is this pill a good thing or a bad thing for
the black community, however it is constructed?
Professor Culp: Like all good medicine used in the right situation, it will work. This pill is required medicine for individuals in
some situations, but we are asking it to do much more than it is
designed for, and we are requiring it in situations where it will do
some harm. We require the black community to take this pill but at
the same time to cure themselves of any social ills. Requiring the
pill works against the macrosolutions of community involvement
and creation. In addition, if government looks only to individual
solutions, we cannot be guaranteed that we will achieve justice or
equality. Title VII has to be reformed to allow difference, but, as I
have suggested elsewhere, that permission for difference is never
likely to be permanent.ss
Geneva Crenshaw: I don't think the black community demands
justice. I think it just wants the possibility of progress,· and your
modified proposal doesn't even do that. How do we form these
"better" communities, and how do we get .the positive aspects of
race without getting negative aspects as well?

II.

CULTURE AND EQUALITY IN TITLE

VII

Suddenly I was transported from the Harvard conference room to
a small television studio with large monitors and huge television cameras. Around a seedy wooden table that looked elegant on the
monitors sat four black or brown people, myself among them,
flanked by two white males. The smaller and more frenetic white
man began to speak as a voice from the darkened studio said,
"You're on the air."
'
55. See generally Culp, supra note 22.
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Announcer: Live from Washington - Crossfire. 56 On the left,
Michael Neoliberal, and on the right, Patrick Ultraconservative.
Tonight - the "Michael Jackson Pill." In the crossfire, Jerome
McCristal Culp, Jr., Professor of Law at Duke University School of
Law, and Michael Delgado, Professor of Law at Harvard Law
School; and in opposition, George Hernandez, Professor of English
at UCLA, and Joan Martinez, writer.57
Michael Neoliberal: Welcome to Crossfire - the Michael
Jackson Pill. Simple and elegant solution to this country's race
problem, or arrogant tool of white supremacy? The Michael Jackson Pill will eliminate race. Is this the most elegant solution to racism possible? Shouldn't we endorse it? In our crossfire tonight we
have two of the bevy of law faculty advising Geneva Crenshaw, who
argued NAACP v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the petitioner this afternoon before the Supreme Court. They are Jerome
Culp, a professor at Duke Law School, and Michael Delgado, a professor at Harvard Law School and the author of Browning the Law:
A Definitive Look at Culture, Race, and Community. For the other
side, Joan Martinez, civil rights expert, author, and generally wise
person; and George Hernandez - author, writer, and professor of
English.
Joan, you and your group, Neoconservatives for the Status Quo,
have written an amicus brief in this case arguing that black people
ought to be subject to fines if they refuse the --: how should I say "kind" offer of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and won't
take the Michael Jackson Pill. Wasn't Justice Blackmun right when
he asked counsel for Massachusetts whether this was not simply an
effort to strip black people of their racial being?
Joan Martinez: I don't know what you and Justice Blackmun
are talking about. Race doesn't exist and culture does, so all the
Michael Jackson Pill does is remove false markers for injustice. I
would have thought that all right-thinking people would be in favor
of such a plan, but the truth is that liberals get a great deal of pleasure from being the recipients of government largesse. They will
not let go of race - and not for positive reasons - but because
they like singing the blues.
Jerome Culp: There are reasons why people might want to - as
you say - "sing the blues." We have failed to adequately address
our race problems - problems that center on the issue of racial
56. This Part is patterned after the successful news-discussion program Crossfire (CNN
television broadcast, 1982-present).
57. Michael Delgado, George Hernandez, and Joan Martinez are fictional characters.
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difference. Blacks suffer higher unemployment, make less money,
and are more likely to be incarcerated than are whites. In addition
... [At this point, the larger and more physically imposing figure
seated at the right end of the desk, Patrick Ultraconservative, interrupts, and the television screen shifts to him and seems to focus on
his eyebrows.]
Patrick Ultraconservative: Jerry! Take the pill. We all know
these statistics, but the truth is they are irrelevant. If black people
simply will play their part, race as we know it will go away. This is
the quintessential American solution of blending the many into
one. My grandparents did this when they came here from Ireland.
Others from Eastern Europe and Italy have done so. Now, Asian
immigrants from Taiwan, Korea, and Vietnam are doing this with
few problems. Many Hispanics have done this: Why shouldn't the
poor, overworked taxpayer of Massachusetts say enough is enough?
We have paid for enough welfare and enough affirmative action take the pill.
Michael Delgado: Pat, as always, you have it wrong. This pill is
a snare and a delusion. It attempts to deal with America's race
problem as a black-and-white issue. It is not. There are lots of
shades between and within black and white. Indeed, I come from a
group that is not definable by traditional American racial classifications. We see ourselves as tied to each other by culture and language and imagination and less effectively by notions of color or
race. Race is not irrelevant, but it also does not define our identity
or the nature of the problems we face in the job market.
Joan Martinez: Michael, I agree that Hispanics are different.
We are not black people in brownface, but we have to support the
kinds of changes in ourselves, in our communities, and in others
that will make this a better place.
Michael Delgado: If you want to understand the problems of
the assimilation you advocate, then listen to Juan Perea, a professor
of law at the University of Florida.58 He has pointed out that we
have had no significant enforcement activity against national origin
discrimination in the almost thirty years of Title VII's existence.59
Very few cases have been decided with respect to national origin,
and even liberal judges have been willing to find that an employer
can fire an emJ(loyee for speakin~ Spanish to a fellow employee on
58. See Juan F. Perea, National Origin Discrimination, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805
(1994); see also Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE LJ. 1329 (1991).
59. See Perea, supra note 58, at 807-09.
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the job.60 This can be true even if speaking Spanish is a practical
necessity for parts of the job - for example, if some of the customers speak Spanish.
Jerome Culp: I take it that you are saying that Title VII already
requires of Spanish-speaking people a kind of "Anglo" pill that is
the moral equivalent of the Michael Jackson Pill.
Patrick Ultraconservative: Are you suggesting, Professors Culp
and Delgado;"that employment discrimination law should allow
someone to make it more difficult for an employer to be able to
control his workers? It seems to me that Title VII law simply requires employees to take a very limited pill in order to get and keep
a job. This pill is not offensive and does not extend beyond work
situations. Latinos should adjust to the environment that exists.
Michael Neoliberal: Ms. Martinez, do you agree with my bombastic colleague, Mr. Ultraconservative, that people should have to
change to be able to enter the work force? Should women have to
put up with pornography and sexually explicit comments at a construction site, for example? Are we willing to require women to
take a male pill to be in the work force?
Joan Martinez: Some of this activity could be discriminatory towards women or Hispanics. If an employer altered his work force
to make it more offensive to most women after women came on
board, that might be discrimination. But women should be willing
to become like men to the extent that it is job related. If the work
force is already pornographic or sexually explicit, women should be
willing to put up with it.
Jerome Culp: That's the rub, isn't it? When do we find something "job related" and when do we see it as like this Michael Jackson Pill, just enforcing the norms? The problem is that norms
change and the law has to ask what is fair about those norms.
When a woman construction worker comes on the job and needs to
use the bathroom, is it all right to have dirty and unsafe conditions
60. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (Rubin, J.) (holding that an em·
ployer may fire employees for speaking Spanish to one another during work time even when
Spanish is required for the job of retail service to a partially Spanish-speaking clientele), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981). Judge Rubin of the Fifth Circuit had been one of the most
committed and passionate defenders of the claims of the oppressed, so many were surprised
that he authored this opinion. For a careful examination of this case in light of Judge Rubin's
other jurisprudence, see Martha Chamallas, Racial Segregation and Cultural Domination: A
Rubin Trilogy on Title VII, 52 LA. L. REv 1457 (1992) (noting the Judge Rubin was able to
see the issues of segregation and oppression but had a more difficult time understanding
cultural oppression as race discrimination). According to Judge Rubin, culture is mutable
but race is not; Professor Chamallas shows this to be stilted and limited view of culture. See
id. at 1475-76.

August 1994]

Equality, Race, and Culture

2635

that are a threat to her but not to men? Do we do justice in the
situation to require her to suffer bladder infections on the altar of
normality? 61
Patrick Ultraconservative: Professor Culp, you are avoiding the
question by altering the facts faced by the Supreme Court. We do
not have an Anglo pill or a gender pill; we have the Michael Jackson Pill. This pill is about ending racism.
Jerome Culp: Tell me, Pat, would you take a pill that altered
your sexual orientation or shifted your ethnicity from Irish to
Arabic?
Patrick Ultraconservative: Those two questions are not the
same. I am proud of my Irish heritage, as I am sure you are of your
African-American heritage, but I do not think that I would be injured by being required to become part of some other dominant
ethnic group. If I went to Saudi Arabia, I would assume I would
need to be like them. Indeed, if I moved to Greenwich Village or
San Francisco and the people there wanted me to take a "sophisticated" pill or a "cool Californian" pill to live there, I would move
right back. But I still think they should have the right to require the
pills. Law is about imposing reasonable norms on others. Now if
they wanted me to take a "queer" pill, that would not be about
normality. That would be about trying to make me a child molester
or a deviant. One's normal sexual orientation is not the kind of
normality that can be changed, any more than I could require you
to take a pill to become a sadomasochist. Title VII appropriately
allows employers to make black women straighteQ. their hair and
Chinese women cut theirs. Title VII also allows employers to require white women to be men. None of these requirements are unfair or inappropriate. Like the Miqhael Jackson Pill, they merely
require a change to normality.
Michael Neoliberal: Do I see a great deal of homophobia peeping out, Pat?
Michael Delgado: You don't understand justice for those who
are different. You see the result as creating "normality" out of
chaos. For those of us with multiple experiences and cultures that
are the same and different, to require a single response is to miss
the possibility of diversity, whether because of race, gender, or sexual orientation.
61. See Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that a construction company that did not provide sanitary toilet facilities for either men or women could be held
liable on a disparate impact claim under Title VII because of women's greater risk of disease
or infection).
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Joan Martinez: Diversity is permitted in this system. Any employer can require any normality it wants. A Korean cleaning
agency can require Korean ethics and normality in its job force. In
that sense, Title VII allows multiple pills to be consumed by the
community.
Jerome Culp: That notion of diversity accepts the existing allocation of employers as appropriate. It says that this status quo, if
not perfect now, will produce justice in the future. I question
whether that's true. Requiring the Michael Jackson Pill only works
if the status quo afterward is just. I do not believe it will appropriately accommodate the possibility of differences in identity, race,
class, or ethnicity.
George Hernandez: You don't see the poor unwilling to take a
pill that will free them from poverty. The normality of difference
seems overrated to those who live with the difference. The truth is
that Professors Culp and Delgado are willing to accept affirmative
action when it comes at the expense of the seniority or job prospects of white males.
Jerome Culp: I see what you're saying, and a plurality of the
Court advocated your position in Wygant. 62 It even quoted Richard
Fallon and Paul Weiler for the proposition that the most important
resource held by workers is their accumulated seniority rights.63
But the truth is that workers' investments in their homes and in
their general education and other human capital is likely to be more
important. The Court has consistently overestimated the injuries to
white Americans and underestimated the concerns of black Ameri62. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). The Court struck down a union
layoff provision that favored black employees. 476 U.S. at 283-84. Writing for the plurality,
Justice Powell noted:
Of course, when a State implements a race-based plan that requires such a sharing of
the burden [of the remedy], it cannot justify the discrimination effect on some individuals because other individuals had approved the plan. Any "waiver" of the right not to be
dealt with by the government on the basis of one's race must be made by those affected .... [T]he petitioners before us today are not "the white teachers as a group."
They are Wendy Wygant and other individuals who claim that they were fired from their
jobs because of their race. That claim cannot be waived by petitioners' more senior
colleagues.
476 U.S. at 281 n.8 (quoting 476 U.S. at 299 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
63.
A worker may invest many productive years in one job and one city with the expectation
of earning the stability and security of seniority. "At that point, the rights and expectations surrounding seniority make up what is probably the most valuable capital asset that
the worker 'owns,' worth even more than the current equity in his home." ••• Layoffs
disrupt these settled expectations in a way that general hiring goals do not.
476 U.S. at 283 (quoting Richard H. Fallon & Paul C. Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 58) (emphasis added). This claim by
Professors Fallon and Weiler was not sound when they wrote it in 1985, and changes in the
labor market since then have made seniority even less important.
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cans. In Wygant, for example, the Court said that the interests of
white teachers were injured by the enforcement of a negotiated seniority provision in a union contract that benefited black teachers.64
The Court ignored the fact that the black teachers lured to the Jackson County school system by this union contract provision were
likely to be disproportionately injured by the Court's refusal to protect their interests. The Court did not deal with the real, lived experiences and concerns of black teachers.
Michael Delgado: You've made that point elsewhere.65 I take it
that you want to say that the Court requires blacks and other people of color to take pills that disempower them. The law requires
that black people give up a lot when they take the Michael Jackson
Pill or some type of Anglo pill, but it does not provide them with
the benefits that it promises.
George Hernandez: That may be so, but that is not the case the
Supreme Court heard today. This pill will do all the things you say
the law cannot. Shouldn't you support it?
Jerome Culp: Even if you're right that there are no other hidden side effects from the Michael Jackson Pill, does it do too much
violence to other interests that are important?
Patrick Ultraconservative: There are no other interests.
Jerome Culp: White politicians and judges have always thought
that black people were inferior and therefore had no interest worthy of respect. That lack of respect existed in the original constitutional draft66 and in cases like Dred Scott, 67 the Civil Rights Cases, 68
and Plessy v. Ferguson. 69 Haldeman's diaries suggest that Richard
Nixon thought so,70 and descriptions of President Eisenhower suggest that he believed in states' rights and the inferiority of black
people.71 I have argued that this flavor is not totally absent from
64. 476 U.S. at 282-84 & n.8.
65. See Culp, supra note 22, at 978-83.
66. Blacks were not mentioned in the original constitutional draft directly but were euphemistically noted as "other persons." U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and
direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States ... according to their respective
Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons ...
three fifths of all other persons." (emphasis added)); see Culp, supra note 2, at 67-68 & n.84.
67. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
68. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
69. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
70. See H.R. HALDEMAN, THE HALDEMAN DIARIES 53 (1994) (remarks of Richard
Nixon as recorded by H.R. Haldeman) ("[T]here has never in history been an adequate black
nation, and they are the only race of which this is true.").
71. See, e.g., HARRY s. ASHMORE, CIVIL RIGHTS AND WRONGS 86, 121-23 (1994) (noting
that General Eisenhower opposed desegregating the military and as President gave only
lukewarm support to ending school segregation).
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the current Court.72 This pill does not avoid the problem of imposing a form of inferiority on those who are required to take it. It's a
very "American" nonsolution to what W.E.B. Du Bois described as
"the problem of the 1\ventieth Century."73
Patrick Ultraconservative: We'll be right back with Michael in
the crossfire.
,
[A commercial flashes in front of us, showing ethnically unplaceable, androgenous people buying, selling, and making fools of themselves. It is probably just my imagination, but it appears that the
group becomes whiter and wh~ter as the commercials continue.]
Michael Neoliberal: We're back. Pat, this pill is not the savior
of the universe, but it's also not the greatest evil. If employers want
to give this pill to their employees, or if the government wants to
require Haitian refugees to take it, or if the government wants to
provide it to criminals in return for early parole, it seems to me to
be totally consistent with American principles. I do think that the
notion of imposing a fine may be too harsh, however, and I think
the Court should strike down that part of the Massachusetts statute.
Patrick Ultraconservative: Michael, you're closer to the truth
than you normally are. But if employers, the border patrol, and
immigration officials can require employees who want to get a promotion or a job, immigrants who want to enter this country, and
inmates who want an early parole to take this pill, why can't the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts impose a penalty for not taking
it? Black people have to stop using race as a crutch and become
"just" Americans.
Ill.

THE DECISION

Without warning, the television studio became a small, elegant,
wood-paneled room. I suddenly realized that this small room was
the Supreme Court. I was sitting in the gallery when a speaker from
the bench began to read an opinion in the old-fashioned way. He or
she said his or her name, but his or her face kept changing from man
to woman, from bearded to clean shaven, and very occasionally from
white to black. The speaker was a Supreme Court Justice, and he or
she read the opinion of the Court with slow precision:
This action comes on appeal from a decision of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court upholding Massachusetts General Law
72. See Culp, supra note 2, at 77-87.
73. W.E. BURGHARDT Du B01s, THE SouLS OF BLACK FoLK at v {Fawcett Publications
1961) {1903) ("[T]he problem of the 1\ventieth Century is the problem of the color line.").
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1619.28 against challenges that the statute inappropriately and invidiously discriminates against black citizens of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts in violation of the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. We affirm.
Dr. Michael Jackson developed the racial elimination and decoloring pill as part of his work on the gene project at Hollywood University. Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston was one of the
principal locations for the successful trials of the pill. After the development and trials of this pill, the legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed General Law 1619.28. This law requires all citizens of Massachusetts who are not white to take the Michael Jackson
Pill.a Violation of this statute constitutes a felony and subjects the
violator to a $2,000 fine. This case is an appeal from a unanimous
decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court holding that
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has the power to impose these
requirements.
.
.
Although the action of a state through officers charged with the
administration of a law that is fair in appearance may be of such a
character as to constitute a denial of the equal protection of the laws,b
such a conclusion is here neither required nor justified. The statute,
on its face, makes no racial discrimination, and the record fails to
show the existence of such discrimination in application.c We should
note that the result we reach in this case does not tum on the fact that
the pill makes black people white; the result would be exactly the
same if we were dealing with a law that, as a legitimate effort to cure a
social problem, required all Americans to take a pill that made them
Asian or black.
In 1954, this Court held that "in the field of public education the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."d The following year,
the Court ordered an end to segregated public education "with all
deliberate speed."e Our subsequent jurisprudence has continued to
teach that race has no place in our constitutional edifice.f This has
been an unvarying principle of the framers of our post-Civil War cona. A group of nonblack and nonwhite citizens have challenged the application of this
statute to them. We express no opinion on those claims because it appears that Massachusetts has tried to enforce the statute only with respect to black citizens.
b. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (striking down a law that on its face
applied to everyone but that in practice was used only against the Chinese).
c. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 231 (1911) (holding that the mere fact that a law
was applied against a black person does not establish a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause without a showing that the law either discriminated on its face or was applied in a
discriminatory manner).
d. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown I).
e. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II).
f. See, for example, Justice O'Connor's description of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 19
(1986), in her concurrence to a denial of certiorari in Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940
(1986):
Batson, in my view, depends upon this Nation's profound commitment to the ideal of
racial equality, a commitment that refuses to permit the State to act on the premise that
racial differences matter....
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stitutional and legislative history. Stretching from the original civil
rights statutesg to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,h Congress
has joined us in trying to create a world in which, by statute, race does
not exist. The so-called Michael Jackson Pill requires us to examine
how that jurisprudence of color blindness should link up with our
other concerns about race and difference.
The issues this pill raises can be seen most clearly in our jurisprudence on Title VII and race. Title VII renders it unlawful "for an
employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." i Accordingly, this Court has rejected the notion that race ought
to be the deciding factor in employment decisions) Consider an
example:k Assume that forty percent of a business's work force are
members of a particular minority group - a group that comprises
only ten percent of the relevant labor market. An applicant, who is a
member of that group, applies for an opening for which he is minimally qualified. He is rejected by a hiring officer of that same minority group, and the search to fill the opening continues. The rejected
applicant files suit for racial discrimination under Title VII, and
before the suit comes to trial, the supervisor who conducted the company's hiring is fired. Under McDonnell Douglas, 1 the plaintiff could
easily show a prima facie case of discrimination.m Moreover, under
the interpretation of our law advocated by some former members of
this Court, not only must the company come forward with some explanation for the refusal to hire - which it will have to try to confirm
We ought not delude ourselves that the deep faith that race should never be relevant
has completely triumphed over the painful social reality that, sometimes, it may be. That
the Court will not tolerate prosecutors' racially discriminatory use of the peremptory
challenge, in effect, is a special rule of relevance, a statement about what this Nation
stands for, rather than a statement of fact.
479 U.S. at 941-42 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (denying petition for certiorari); see also City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (rejecting a municipal set-aside requirement that a fixed percentage of government contracts be awarded to minority business enterprises); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding that a preferential
layoff scheme favoring minorities over nonminorities with greater seniority violated the
Equal Protection Clause); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that the effects of
racial prejudice cannot justify the removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural
mother); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down a state statutory scheme
designed to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications).
g. The post-Civil War Congresses passed a number of civil rights statutes to eliminate the
pernicious impact of slavery. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted
in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1981-82 (1988)).
h. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
i. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
j. See generally Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
k. See Justice Scalia's hypothetical in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742,
2750-51 (1993).
1. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
m. See 411 U.S. at 802 (describing the elements of a prima facie case).
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out of the mouth of its now-antagonistic former employee - but the
jury must be instructed that if they find that explanation to be incorrect, they must assess damages against the company, whether or not
they believe the company was guilty of racial discrimination.n The
disproportionate minority makeup of the company's work force and
the fact that its hiring officer was of the same minority group as the
plaintiff is irrelevant, because the plaintiff's case can be proved "indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 0 That approach, in an effort to create a race-free
workplace, transforms race into the most important and devastating
piece of evidence in the case against the employer. The elimination of
the element of race altogether will more effectively afford those who
choose to avail themselves of the pill a race-free employment and social environment. The pill seems to this Court to be a reasonable and
rational response - indeed, the appropriate response - to the fact
that race exists and is difficult to deal with.
The alternative approach to race in society - the approach advocated by the petitioner - requires special treatment of racial minorities to counteract the harms of a history of discrimination. We have
rejected in this context the notion that race can be the justification for
preference. For example, in a case involving admission to a medical
school, we held that setting aside places for racial minorities violates
the Fourteenth Amendment.P Among the justifications offered in
support of the plan were the desire to "reduc[e] the historic deficit of
traditionally disfavored minorities in medical school and the medical
profession" and the need to "counte[r] the effects of societal discrimination."q Five members of the Court determined that none of these
interests could justify a plan that completely eliminated nonminorities
from consideration for a specified percentage of opportunities. Justice Powell contrasted the "focused" goal of remedying "wrongs
worked by specific instances of racial discrimination" with "the remedying of the effects of 'societal discrimination,' an amorphous concept
of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past."r He indicated
that for the governmental interest in remedying past discrimination to
be triggered, "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations" had to be present.5
In another case, four members of the Court applied heightened
scrutiny to a race-based system of employee _layoffs.1 Justice Powell,
n. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2759 & n.5 (Souter, J., joined by White, Blackmun & Stevens,
JJ., dissenting); see also United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
717-18 (1983) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
o. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
p. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
q. 438 U.S. at 306 (citations omitted).
r. 438 U.S. at 307.
s. 438 U.S. at 307.
t. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (holding that the
school board's policy granting preferential protection against layoffs on the basis of race violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
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writing for the plurality, again drew the distinction between societal
discrimination, which is an inadequate basis for race-conscious classifications, and the type of identified discrimination that can support
and define the scope of race-based relief.U
For obvious reasons, societal discrimination alone is an inadequate
basis for race-conscious classifications. It is sheer speculation that any
particular black citizen might be able to do better than white citizens
if he had not suffered the social and economic deprivations associated
with his race in our society. There may be numerous explanations for
the differences between a particular black person and a white person,
including past societal discrimination in education and economic opportunities as well as both black and white career and entrepreneurial
choices. A black person, for example, may be more likely to be attracted to jobs that provide low incomes or more leisure time.
To accept the petitioner's claim that past societal discrimination
alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preference would be to
open the door to competing claims for "remedial relief" for every
disadvantaged group. The dream of a nation of equal citizens would
be threatened. Therefore, we find that the Commonwealth has an
interest in pursuing other, less problematic solutions to the problem
of race.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts contends that the petitioner
cannot establish standing in this case because it failed to allege that
one or more of its members would suffer an injury through the enforcement of the challenged ordinance. The decision that is most
closely analogous to this case is Regents of University of California v.
Bakke. In Bakke, a twice-rejected white male medical school applicant claimed that the school's admissions program, which reserved
sixteen of the one hundred places in the entering class for minority
applicants, was inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Addressing the argument that the applicant lacked standing to challenge
the program, Justice Powell concluded that the "constitutional requirements of Article III" had been satisfied because the requisite
"injury" was the medical school's "decision not to permit Bakke to
compete for all 100 places in the class, simply because of his race."v
Thus, "even if Bakke had been unable to prove that he would have
been admitted in the absence of the special program, it would not
follow that he lacked standing."w Four other Justices joined Justice
Powell in this portion of his opinion.x
In this case, however, the petitioner does not allege a harm that is
cognizable. This pill, like much that is required of citizens, simply
imposes an inconvenience in order to remove a problem that is ereu. 476 U.S. at 277-29.
v. 438 U.S. at 281 n.14.
w. 438 U.S. at 280-81 n.14.
x. 438 U.S. at 272; see also Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v.
City of Jacksonville, Fla.-, 113 S. Ct. 2297; 2302-03 (1993) (Thomas, J.) (comparing Bakke to
the case at hand and concluding that the "injury in fact" in equal protection cases may be the
imposition of a barrier, not the "ultimate inability to obtain the benefit").
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ated by the status of race. It removes this problem by eliminating the
status of race altogether. Thus, it cannot be seen as creating a real
injury to the people represented by the NAACP. Petitioner contends
in its brief that the injury suffered by African Americans because of
this pill is analogous to the injury to the plaintiff in Bakke. The difference, unfortunately for the petitioner's position, is that in that case
the harm that was suffered was something that was constitutionally
recognizable: the deprivation of the constitutionally cognizable right
to compete for admission to a state medical school. The petitioner in
this case, by contrast, has failed to describe what injury the implementation of this policy will cause for those who take the pill. Those individuals obviously will be treated just as others are. As for those who
refuse to adhere to the statute and do not take the pill, the injury is
not the product of the state's policy but the direct result of the socially
produced notion of race. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has
the right to penalize behavior that will be costly to its citizens. To the
extent that race matters, it is appropriate for the state to eliminate
race.
There remains the question whether the Thirteenth Amendment
limits the ability of the Commonwealth to impose this penalty. In
relevant part, the Thirteenth Amendment provides: "Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."Y In this case, the
petitioner contends that the Commonwealth's imposition of the pill
on black citizens constitutes a "badge of slavery."z The record, however, discloses no racially discriminatory motive on the part of the
Massachusetts legislature. Instead, the record demonstrates that the
interests that motivated the legislature are legitimate. The elimination of the consequences of racial difference is sufficient to justify an
adverse impact on the NAACP and those of its members who are
somewhat inconvenienced by having to take the pill. That inconvenience cannot be considered an actual restraint on the liberty of black
citizens that is in any sense comparable to the odious practice the
Thirteenth Amendment was designed to eradicate. The argument
that the pill violates the amendment must therefore rest, not on the
actual consequences of the law, but rather on the symbolic significance of the fact that most of those who will be inconvenienced by the
action are black. This pill, however, simply makes black citizens of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts white. Because we understand
"badges and incidents of slavery" to have the opposite effect, this pill
cannot be such a badge or incident. Proper respect for the dignity of
all citizens requires that they all accept the same burdens as well as
the same benefits of citizenship, regardless of their racial or ethnic
origin. The elimination of race altogether clearly serves those ends.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that even if. the
law discriminates between black and white citizens, this discriminay. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
z. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1883).
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tion is nonetheless justified because the statute is narrowly tailored to
serve compelling state interests. Specifically, the court concluded that
this law helps to ensure the basic human rights of members of groups
that have historically been subjected to discrimination, including the
right of such group members to live in peace where they wish. We do
not doubt that these interests are compelling; we are convinced the
law can be said to promote them.
We affirm.

